Social Cognition, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2015, pp. 483–504
JIANG ET AL.

CAN TRUST FACILITATE BRIBERY?

Can Trust Facilitate Bribery? Experimental
Evidence from China, Italy, Japan, and
the Netherlands
Ting Jiang
Tilburg University, The Netherlands; University of Pennsylvania
Jan Willem Lindemans and Cristina Bicchieri
University of Pennsylvania

This article investigates the impact of trust on bribery. We measure trust with
a survey question from the World Values Survey on whether respondents
think others would take advantage of them if given the chance, and we observe bribery behavior in an experimental bribery game. The research was
conducted in China and Italy, which have relatively high perceived-corruption levels, as well as in Japan and the Netherlands, which have relatively
low perceived-corruption levels. In the bribery game, participants have the
opportunity to bribe another participant to cheat to their advantage. We
hypothesized that honoring bribing agreements depends on trust, the endorsement of such agreements is independent of trust. We find evidence
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Cooperating, trusting, and reciprocating behaviors are usually considered prosocial, in the sense that they benefit society at large. Yet, these same behaviors are
anything but socially beneficial when they occur in the interactions among criminals: consider bribery. The briber and the bribee can strike an agreement to cooperate: The briber will pay a bribe to receive a benefit, and the bribee will receive a
compensation for providing some illegal service. However, the bribery agreement
is nonbinding: the briber may defect on the bribe payment if the illegal service is
delivered first; likewise, the bribee may defect on the delivery of the illegal service
if the bribe is offered first. In a sense, bribery is a case of a trust game, in which
cooperation is difficult to enforce.
When there are frequent interactions among the parties, it is generally assumed
that trust and cooperation will emerge and stabilize. Individuals who care about
their reputation as reliable partners have no incentive to cheat in repeated trust
games or other social dilemmas with no known end point. Criminal interactions
rely on trust as well. When trust breaks down—perhaps because the temptation to
defect is too high—and legal enforcement is not an option, criminal organizations
often seek to restore cooperation through violent means (Skarbek, 2014).
Many illegal interactions occur irregularly and infrequently, which limits the
effectiveness of reputational concerns and group sanctions. Bribing a policeman,
an office employee, or a government officer may be one-time events that require
a high level of reciprocal trust since illegal deals cannot rely on the courts for enforcement, that is, these one-time interactions require cooperation and trust between the parties. Yet, it is exactly in this sphere of illegality that we expect the
least trust. Who would trust criminals and crooks? It might also be expected that
people engaged in bribery would display a low level of trust in their fellow perpetrators, that is, they may be more inclined to think that their fellow offenders
would take advantage of others whenever they can.
In this article, we study how self-reported generalized trust can facilitate illegal
agreements. We focus on bribery, which is essentially the abuse of power in return
for a material gift.

Trust and Corruption
There is an extensive literature on trust and corruption, but there is little consensus
on the relationship between the two. According to some scholars, societies with
the highest levels of trust are the least corrupt (e.g., Rothstein, 2000).1 In such societies, trust is a catalyst for socially beneficial cooperation. It has also been argued,
however, that societies with greater levels of (particularized) trust might exhibit
greater levels of “both corrupt and donative transfers” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p.
1. Among those who claim that high-trust societies are less corrupt, there is some discussion on the
direction of causation. Some found that low levels of trust drive high levels of corruption (Uslaner,
1999, 2005). Others found that (perceived) high level of corruption causes people to trust each other
less (Eek & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein, 2000; Uslaner & Badescu, 2004). Others claim that trust and
corruption influence each other, so that countries are either blessed with a virtuous circle of high trust
and low corruption or a vicious circle of low trust and high corruption (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).

CAN TRUST FACILITATE BRIBERY?

485

97, quoted by Banuri & Eckel, 2012). If so, trust might be a catalyst for both socially
beneficial and socially detrimental cooperation.
The discrepancy, according to some, is due to different interpretations of trust,
namely, as generalized trust, defined as trust in people in general, or as particularized trust, defined as trust restricted to one’s in-group. Using data from the World
Values Survey and the World Business Environment Survey, Tonoyan (2005) found
that the most corrupt countries had low levels of generalized trust, but high levels
of particularized trust (see also Ensminger, 2001).
Some authors (Putnam, 1993) claim that there is continuity between particularized and generalized trust. According to this view, individuals who are embedded
in a thick network of trusting relationships and experience the trustworthiness of
people around them will have the propensity to extend trust even to strangers.
In this light, it would be expected that a person who is accustomed to particularistic trust will be disposed to generalize and invest resources even when faced
with anonymous partners. There are, however, many examples of discontinuity
between particularized and generalized trust, and examples abound of societies
in which individuals display high levels of trust or reciprocation among family
members and small networks, but mistrust strangers, institutions, and other beneficiaries of generalized trust.
Yamagishi (2001) made an important distinction between trust and assurance
that partly captures the above discontinuity. People within committed relations
or stable groups feel safe with insiders because formal and informal sanctions (including ostracism) against a betrayer are strong enough. Assurance is precisely an
expectation of trustworthiness of others based on an assessment of their interests
and incentives. Assurance does not generalize to interactions or situations that are
not “guaranteed” by existing incentive structures. Trust, by contrast, is meaningful only in situations of great social uncertainty, in which there are incentives to
act dishonestly and the consequences of being the target of dishonesty are costly.
Trust, in Yamagishi’s view, is independent of an assessment of trustworthiness and
is, rather, a generalized expectation about human benevolence.
We agree with Yamagishi in linking trust with social uncertainty. We take trust
to be the willingness of a trustor “to make oneself vulnerable” to the actions of a
trustee because the trustor believes that most people are trustworthy. The trustor
makes himself vulnerable by entering a situation in which the trustee can harm
him. In turn, the trustee is trustworthy if she “voluntarily refrains from taking
advantage of the trustor’s vulnerability” (Bohnet, 2008). Trust thus matters in situations in which it may be advantageous to make oneself vulnerable to another, but
only if that other does not take advantage of one’s vulnerability. Such trust situations are nicely captured by the trust game developed by experimental economists
(Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer & Weigelt, 1988). As argued earlier,
trust is important to bribery because people need to trust that the bribery agreement will be honored—as it cannot be enforced by courts—and they need to trust
that the agreement will remain secret. Consistent with this view, Lambsdorf (2002)
found that greater trust on the potential bribees’ honoring the bribery agreements
predicts higher corruption levels.
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The present study
In this article, we report some specific results on trust and corruption from a larger
experiment (Jiang, 2015a, 2015b). The larger experiment was designed to examine
how social preferences and culture predict cheating in different corruption contexts ranging from embezzlement to bribery. Jiang (2015a) mainly reports results
on how social preferences predict cheating in embezzlement contexts, whereas
Jiang (2015b) mainly reports results on how social preferences predict behavior in
bribery contexts. In this article, we report results on how trust predicts behavior
in bribery contexts as we believe that it is a meaningful investigation to show that
trust affects behavior in this game above and beyond social preferences.
We do not elicit trust behaviorally. We measure trust with the following question
from the World Values Survey: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” Although more
elaborate measurement tools for trust have been developed (e.g., Couch, Adams,
& Jones, 1996; Couch & Jones, 1997; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) and trust attitudes elicited by surveys might predict trusting behavior only weakly (Glaeser,
Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000), we have opted for the simple self-report
measure for practical reasons. Strictly speaking, the World Value Survey question
elicits a diffuse expectation of others’ trustworthiness, different from history-based
trust founded on previous interactions. Measured this way, trust is best understood as an enduring attitude or a personality trait (Rotter, 1967, 1971; Stack, 1978).
Moreover, though a belief in trustworthiness is not equivalent to trust, we know
that trustworthiness beliefs are the best predictors of trusting behavior (Ashraf,
Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006). Hence, we will just talk about people’s trust.2
In the experiment, participants played the “dice bribery game” introduced by
Jiang (2015b), in which pairs of participants could chat online and enter bribery
agreements. The briber would promise to transfer money to the bribee, and the
bribee would promise to cheat to benefit the briber. However, after entering a bribery agreement, each party could secretly renege on his or her promise. In other
words, all players had an incentive to renege on their promise.
The dice bribery game resembles Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner’s (2000) moonlighting game, in the treatment with the nonbinding contract. The moonlighting
game simulates the contracting of unreported labor (“moonlighting”) based on
a trust game. In this game, the trustee can propose a nonbinding contract to the
trustor before playing the trust game. The dice bribery game differs from the nonbinding contract moonlighting game in several important aspects. First, both players can initiate agreements in the more natural environment of chats. Second, the
possibility of entering agreements is not made explicit in the instructions but has
2. Note also that our trust question asks whether respondents think “most people” would take
advantage of them, which seems to refer to people in general, so that the question seems to elicit
generalized trust. However, since the trust question is not explicitly about people “in general,” it is
possible that some respondents interpret it as a question about particularized trust. In the conclusion,
we make some suggestions on differentiating between generalized and particularized trust in
studying the impact of trust on corruption.
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to be discovered. Finally, the rules of the game do not allow cheating, while in
the moonlighting game moonlighting is allowed. To simulate that cheating is bad,
Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002) designed a bribery game with negative
outcomes for bribery and the possibility that colluders get sanctioned. However,
bribing and cheating are still explicitly described as legitimate game options and
neutrally framed, and so is sanctioning.3 For these reasons, our dice bribery game
provides a more natural and realistic simulation of the rule-breaking and power
abuse aspect of bribery.
Our main hypothesis is that the honoring of bribing agreements depends on
trust, but that the endorsement of such agreements does not. We hypothesize that
individuals with high levels of trust will tend to honor bribery agreements. A person who believes that strangers are generally trustworthy is also likely to believe
that, once one enters an agreement the agreement will be kept. The fact that the
agreement is “illegal” should not matter to the promise keeper. What matters is
that he made a promise. Even in situations where bribery agreements are not enforceable, that is, when, defectors cannot be punished, failing to deliver on the
promise made in a bribery agreement can incur psychological costs. Most people
are, for example, generally averse to breaking promises (Vanberg, 2008). Once a
bribery agreement has been reached, the norm of promise keeping demands that
the agreement be honored (Bicchieri, 2002). Our conjecture that trust plays a role in
boosting the likelihood of promise keeping is also related to Jiang’s (2015b) finding
that pro-social bribers tend to keep their promises.
We further examine whether the correlation between trust and corruption varies with the country’s perceived corruption level. More specifically, we suspect
that the correlation between trust and honoring bribery may be lower in countries
in which corruption is socially accepted or even expected (Bicchieri, 2006, 2015).
As a result, the social norm of promise keeping may be a stronger predictor than
the individual personality trait of trust, as the threat of betrayal is less likely to
be present. The experiment was conducted in four countries from two different
continents, Asia and Europe. In each continent, one country has a low score on the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)4 (China: 3.6; Italy: 3.9), whereas the other has a
high score (Japan: 8; The Netherlands: 8.9).
All in all, we conjecture that trust increases the likelihood that a promise will be
kept. The more one expects others to honor their promises, the more psychological
cost one would suffer when breaking the agreement. A high-trust person will thus
be more trustworthy, even if the transaction is illegal. On the other hand, if one
does not trust that the partner will honor the promise, one could find a legitimate
3. Barr and Serra (2010) opt for non-neutral framing, while still describing bribing and cheating
as valid game options. This is an excerpt from their instructions: “The game proceeds as follows.
First, every Private Citizen can offer a bribe to the Public Official with whom he/she is playing.” In
our bribing game, by contrast, the possibility of bribing and cheating needs to be discovered. This
probably feels more natural to participants.
4. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how uncorrupt their
public sector is perceived to be by analysts, businessmen, and experts (http://cpi.transparency.org/
cpi2011/results/). It is a composite index combining surveys and assessments of corruption collected
by different institutions that met the criteria set by Transparency International.
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excuse for not honoring the agreement. The role of trust, in this sense, is a catalyst
for cooperation, even if the result of this cooperation is socially harmful. Finally,
we predict that the perceived corruption level of participants’ country of origin
will moderate the correlation between trust and carrying out a bribery agreement.

Method
Participants
For this study, a total of 216 students participated in experiments that were conducted between October 2010 and July 2011 in four countries. Data of 16 participants were excluded from analysis due to missing observations on the trust measure. See Table 1 or the demographic data and the experimental field sites in which
the data were collected in each country.

The Bribery Game
The dice bribery game (Jiang, 2015b) models the essence of bribery by allowing the
bribee to cheat and give the briber the requested benefits. This paradigm differs
from the traditional bribery paradigms in the following way. Instead of being given an explicit option to bribe and be bribed in a modified trust game, participants
themselves need to self-discover the loopholes of the rules when freely negotiating
via an online chat the exchange of a side payment and the cheating service. The
game consists of two stages: a bribing stage, in which the briber has the opportunity to bribe the bribee, and a cheating stage, in which the bribee has the opportunity
to cheat to the advantage of the briber (see Figure 2). We first discuss the cheating
stage, since it will help to understand the function of the preceding bribing stage.
Cheating Stage. Participants pair up with one player randomly assigned as the
“Scorer” (the bribee) and the other the “Thrower” (the briber). Scorer earns a fixed
amount of 50 points. Thrower’s payoff depends on the outcome of the dice game.
The dice game is repeated for 15 rounds and each round proceeds as follows: First,
Scorer secretly chooses which side of the die will count for Thrower’s payoff: the
side facing up or the side facing down. The die is a normal 6-sided die, with the
number of pips of opposite sides always adding up to 7. If 1 is up, down is 6; if 2
is up, down is 5; etc. (see Table 2 for a summary of the points earned by Thrower,
given that Scorer chooses either up or down). The Scorer makes his choice in his
mind and does not write it down or tell anybody at this moment.
Second, after Scorer has confirmed having secretly chosen a side (up or down),
Thrower throws a die (on the computer screen). As the final step, Scorer indicates
on the screen which side he or she chose in the first step. Scorer can do this truthfully or not, and there is no way for anybody to find this out with certainty. Whatever Scorer reports, the payoff of Thrower for that round is calculated accordingly,
and Thrower immediately sees his or her payoff for that round. In sum, the three
steps of the dice game are:

0.85 (48)

21.3 (48)

23.6 (55)

21.5 (64)

24.5 (35)

Age

1.73 (48)

1.44 (54)

1.14 (63)

1.31 (36)

Number of
siblings

11.49 (47)

10.72 (54)

3.54 (63)

1.86 (36)

Number of
countries
visited

3.15 (48)

2.27 (55)

2.44 (32)

2.19 (36)

Experience
(Experiments
participated)

96% (48)

93% (55)

42% (64)

44% (36)

Major:
economics &
business

Note. Source from Jiang, 2015a. Number of participants with available demographic data in brackets. Some of the survey data on trust (13 from China, 1 from Japan, and 2 from Italy) fail to be
recorded because of interrupted Internet connection.

NL (n = 48)

Tilburg University (Tilburg)

0.56 (55)

0.57 (63)

JP (n = 64)

IT (n = 56)

Waseda University (Tokyo)

0.56 (32)

Male

CN (n = 48)

University of Siena (Siena);
University of Taranto (Taranto)

Fudan University (Shanghai); Peking
University (Shenzhen)

Number of
participants

Table 1. Demographic Data of All Participants
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Table 2. Payoffs

Up

1

2

3

4

5

6

Down

6

5

4

3

2

1

(1) Scorer secretly chooses a side;
(2) Thrower throws a die;
(3) Scorer reports which side he or she chose in Step 1.

For instance, if Scorer chooses down in Step 1, Thrower throws 4 in Step 2 and
Scorer reports “down” in Step 3, then Thrower earns 3 points (= 7 – 4). Note that if
Scorer would report “up” in Step 3, then Thrower would earn 4 points. This is exactly how Scorer can cheat for Thrower—by reporting the side that gives the higher payoff, even if it was not chosen in Step 1. Because Scorer can cheat, Thrower
might want to bribe Scorer in the preceding bribery stage, which we discuss below.
Bribing Stage. As in Jiang (2015b), before the cheating stage in which the dice
game is played, each matched pair can negotiate a one-shot transfer of a side
payment X in a virtual chat. Since Thrower earns on average 52.5 points (3.5×15
rounds) without the help of cheating and Scorer earns 50 points, there is not much
reason for participants to transfer money, unless they have cheating in mind. If
anything, 1.25 points could be transferred from Thrower to Scorer out of an equality concern (or 1 or 2 points, since only integers were allowed). On the other hand,
the small difference should suffice for those who are interested in bribes to legitimately negotiate a transfer. It is clear why Thrower might want to bribe Scorer. If
Scorer always cheats to Thrower’s advantage, the latter’s expected payoff rises
from 52.5 to 75 points (15×5 average expected points per round). The time limit
for the discussion is 5 minutes. Both players submit their “report” on the transfer
X in private; that is, the Scorer reports an amount X(S) and the Thrower reports
an amount X(T). This is done through an input box located below the chat window within the allotted five-minute chat. If Scorer and Thrower report the same
amount, i.e., X(S) = X(T) = X, then X will be implemented for the final payment (if
X is positive, the transfer goes to Scorer; if X is negative, it goes to Thrower). Otherwise nothing is transferred. Note that the bribing stage occurs only once, before
the 15 rounds of play (Jiang, 2015b).
The amounts agreed upon cannot be revised after submission. As soon as both
Scorer and Thrower have submitted their amounts, the dice game starts. But neither Scorer nor Thrower is informed about the amount submitted by the other.
Hence, neither player knows whether the agreed-upon transfer (if there is one)
will indeed be implemented so that the briber can take advantage of the bribee by
entering a smaller amount. After five minutes have passed, Thrower and Scorer
move to the cheating stage and play the 15 rounds of the dice game described
above (see Figure 1).

cAn TruST fAcIlITATE BrIBEry?

491

fIGurE 1. diagram of the bribery game. The dashed arrows in the chat indicate that any player
can (privately) input a transfer amount at any time in the 5 minutes allocated to chatting. When
both players have inputted an amount, they move on to the cheating stage. only if both players
input the same amount, the transfer will be that inputted amount. otherwise, the transfer is 0.

Features of the Bribery Game. Throwers (or Scorers) were not told that they can—
or have to—bribe Scorers, and Scorers were not told they can ask Throwers for
bribes. They were not told to play a “bribery game.” The game was described
in neutral terms as a two-persons dice game, with the possibility of a 5-minute
chat for negotiating a transfer X. However, most participants understand very well
what can be done, as best illustrated in a quote by a Scorer: “…unless X is 20 it
would not be interesting for me to cheat for you.”
Thrower and Scorer might come to a bribery agreement, namely an agreement that Thrower will transfer points to Scorer in return for Scorer subsequently
picking advantageous sides. However, neither Thrower’s agreement to transfer
points—that is, to bribe—nor Scorer’s agreement to report sides in a biased way—
that is, to cheat—can be enforced: It is merely cheap talk. The players can defect on
their promises without any chance of getting punished. When deciding to honor
the agreement, they must trust that the other will do so as well. This makes the
bribery game a game of mutual trust.
Since both parties see the earning points of Thrower after each round, Thrower
can tell to a certain extent whether Scorer honored the agreement. However, Scorer
instead can never know whether Thrower honored his side of the agreement. This
is because Thrower enters the transfer amount privately and Scorer does not get
any feedback on how much was ultimately transferred. Even when Scorer receives
payment at the end of the experiment, it is impossible for him to find out how
likely it is that Thrower inputted the agreed amount. Participants know this.

MEAsurEs dErIvEd froM ThE brIbEry GAME
The bribery game provides us with a rich set of measures regarding bribery behavior (see Jiang, 2015b). More specifically, we observe (1) whether participants
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endorse bribery in the chats, (2) whether they subsequently enter a bribery agreement,
(3) how high the bribe amount is, and (4) whether they ultimately honor the bribery
agreement.
Bribery Endorsement. A subject is said to endorse bribery if, in the chat at the
bribing stage, the subject expresses a willingness to enter a bribery agreement,
which implies that (1) Thrower transfers a positive amount to Scorer, and (2) the
latter cheats in favor of the former. A subject endorses bribery either by initially
proposing to enter a bribery agreement, or by accepting or otherwise confirming
such a proposal by the other. We created a dummy variable of bribery endorsement Bendorse, with Bendorse = 1 if the subject endorses bribery.
Bribery Agreement and Bribe Amount. A pair of participants is considered to have
reached a bribery agreement, denoted by the dummy variable Bagree, if both participants (1) endorse bribery and (2) agree to transfer a strictly positive amount from
Thrower to Scorer. Note that it is possible that both participants in a pair endorse
bribery but do not agree on the bribe amount and thus do not reach a bribery
agreement.
Honoring the Bribery Agreement. A Thrower honors the bribery agreement, that is,
Honor(T) = 1, when the Thrower enters the transfer amount agreed upon (remember that this action is fully private). A Scorer, on the other hand, honors the bribery
agreement when the Scorer actually cheats to the advantage of Thrower, as was
agreed upon. When both Scorer and Thrower honor the bribery agreement, we say
the bribery agreement is successfully enforced.
To quantify how much a Scorer has cheated, Jiang (2013) used a measure called
foresight, namely the proportion of advantageous sides this Scorer picks in 15
rounds of the dice game. That is, if fj is a dummy variable that equals 1 when
Scorer chose the advantageous side in round j of 15 rounds (and 0 otherwise),

then

, with 0 ≥ F ≥ 1.

If Scorer always cheated to the advantage of Thrower, then F = 1. If Scorer did
not cheat, the expected average of F was 0.5. By chance, however, foresight could
be much higher (or lower). A binomial test is used to see whether foresight significantly deviates from the expected average of 0.5. On that basis, if there was a
bribery agreement, we say that Scorer has honored cheating (i.e., Honor(S) = 1) if F
≥ 0.80 (one-sided binomial test, p = 0.02).

Trust and Cheating Propensity
Trust. The main explanatory variable of interest was people’s general disposition
to trust others. We measured trust with a survey question on expectations about
others taken from the World Values Survey. The question is “Do you think most
people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try
to be fair?” on a scale from 1 (take advantage) to 10 (are fair).
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Cheating Propensity. We also included participants’ cheating propensity in as it
can be a potential confounding factor. More trusting participants might be less
prone to cheat, and cheating propensity has been found to correlate with bribery
endorsement and honoring (Jiang, 2015b). Participants’ cheating propensity was
elicited by the one-player version of the dice game described above. In the oneplayer dice game (Jiang, 2013), each player is simultaneously Thrower and Scorer. The subject moves through the following three steps: The subject (1) chooses
which side of the die will count for his or her own payoff, (2) throws a die, and (3)
reports which side he or she chose in Step 1. The subject thus has the opportunity
to cheat to his own advantage, rather than to the advantage of another subject,
like in the cheating stage of the bribery game. The cheating game is repeated for
20 rounds. The subject earns an amount of points equal to the sum of pips of the
sides reportedly chosen.
To quantify a subject’s propensity to cheat in the dice game, we used the same
measure of foresight F we used to quantify the cheating by Scorers in the bribery
game. This time

, with fj = 1 when the subject chose the advantageous side in round j of
20 rounds, and 0 ≥ F ≥ 1. We infer that participants probably cheated if F ≥ 0.75
(one-sided binomial test, p = 0.02).

Procedure
The data analyzed in this experiment are taken from a larger experiment (see Jiang,
2015a, 2015b).5 Participants received instructions and a short test of comprehension for the cheating game and proceeded with this game (20 rounds), afterwards
they received instructions and a short comprehension test for the bribery game and
proceeded with this game (15 rounds). Finally, they answered a trust survey.
Entering and Instructions. To alleviate the experimenter effect, instructions were
given by audio files pre-recorded by native speakers. Because of the cross-cultural
nature of the experiments, special precautions were taken. All instructions were
translated into the native language and back-translated into English by different
translators.
Games. In all the games, participants could earn points that were convertible into
money. The average payment per hour was €10 in both Italy and the Netherlands,
45 Yuan in China and ¥1000 in Japan. Participants received 15 fen per point in China, 4 yen per point in Japan, and 4 eurocent per point in Italy and the Netherlands.
Note that participants were not told that they were playing “cheating games” and
“bribery games” or that they could “cheat” and “bribe.” The instructions were
framed neutrally, and participants had to discover by themselves the possibility of
cheating and bribing.
5. Details on the procedure and discussion of other results can be found in Jiang, 2015b.
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Post-Experimental Survey and Payment. At the end of the experiment, participants
completed a survey in which we asked the World Values Survey question on trust.
After that, they were paid.

Results
Descriptive Results: Bribery, Cheating Propensity and Trust
There was much evidence for bribing and reciprocal cheating in the bribery game.
Eighty-seven pairs (out of 100) reached an agreement on a transfer. Seventy-five
pairs agreed on a positive transfer instead of zero or a negative transfer (which implies that the transfer goes from Thrower to Scorer), among which 53 pairs had an
explicit bribery agreement (see Jiang, 2015b for the coding of a bribery agreement
based on the chat data). Among those who reached a bribery agreement, the average agreed upon “bribe” was 14. The average bribe actually paid was 12, as 11%
of the Throwers did not honor the agreement and entered a different number than
the one agreed upon. Most Scorers who agreed on bribery subsequently cheated
for Throwers, with an average foresight of 0.92. Thirteen percent of these Scorers
did not honor the agreement: their foresight cannot be inferred to be statistically
unlikely (F < 0.8, p > 0.02). We report in the Appendix excerpts from players’ chats
that show the role trust plays in bribery agreements.
As for cheating propensity, a substantial proportion of participants cheated for
themselves in the individual cheating game. Moreover, in line with the Corruption Perception Index ranking, the proportion of cheaters was significantly higher
in the corrupt cluster (China and Italy) than in the clean cluster (Japan and the
Netherlands; 74% vs. 56%), χ2(1) = 6.636, p = 0.01, n = 200 (see Jiang, 2015a for more
results on cheating propensity).
Figure 2 shows the overall distribution of trust (1 means “most people try to take
advantage of me whenever they can”; 10 means “most people are fair”). Note that
both the mode and the median were on the lower spectrum of the distribution at
“3.” We used a median split with the median participants included in “Low Trust”
to generate a binary variable of relative trust: we classified those who trusted with
a score of 3 or below as “Low Trust” (n = 116), and those with a score higher than
3 as “High Trust” (n = 84).

Main Results: Trust, Bribery Endorsement, and Bribery
Enforcement
Trust and Bribery Endorsement. Since an agreement in the bribery game is cheap
talk without any monetary cost, we do not expect that more trusting participants
are more likely to enter a bribery agreement, as less trusting participants might be
equally likely to enter such an agreement, except for not honoring it afterwards.
Trust should not play a role in endorsing bribery.
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fIGurE 2. The distribution of trust.

As shown by the Fisher’s exact test results at the bottom row in Table 3 there was
indeed no evidence that high trust participants (both Scorers and Throwers) in our
sample were significantly more or less likely to endorse bribery (p > 0.1, with effect sizes being small or negligible). Table 3 columns 1 and 2 show the respective
proportions of bribery endorsers corresponding to their trust type and their role in
the bribery game for all participants. This result held for both the corrupt country
cluster (China and Italy) and the clean country cluster (The Netherlands and Japan). Columns 3 and 4 show the results only for participants from China and Italy,
two countries that score high in the Corruption Perception Index. The last two
columns show the results only for participants from Japan and the Netherlands,
two countries that score lower in the Corruption Perception Index.
Trust and Bribery Honoring. Our main hypothesis was that trust facilitates the
honoring of the bribery agreement. This hypothesis was partially supported. As
shown in Table 4, columns 1 and 2, high-trust Throwers honored the promise of
paying the bribe more frequently than did low-trust throwers (Cohen’s d = 0.697,
p < 0.05), whereas high-trust Scorers did not more frequently honor the promise
to provide the cheating service (Cohen’s d = 0.152, p > 0.1). The large majority of
high- and low-trust Scorers honored the agreement in both clean and corrupt clusters. Among Throwers, only low-trust throwers defect on their agreement to pay a
bribe. Moreover, as shown in columns 4 and column 6, the effect was found only
in the clean cluster with medium to large effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.857, p < 0.05),
but not in the corrupt cluster (Cohen’s d = 0.406, p > 0.1).
As a robustness check, we used the continuous trust measure. As shown in Table
5, the logistic regression results using the discrete variable of trust were robust:
Trust was not correlated with bribery endorsement for either Scorers or Throwers,
but it was correlated positively with more bribery honoring by Throwers.

p = 0.013**
d = 0.697

p = 0.464

d = 0.152

Note. **p < 0.05.

Cohen’s d

Fisher’s Exact

100% (26 out of 26)
77.8% (21 out of 27)

90.0% (18 out of 20)

84.9% (28 out of 33)

Thrower

High Trust (Trust ≥ 4)

Scorer

All participants
(n = 53 pairs)

Low Trust (Trust < 4)

% Honor Bribery

Table 4. Trust and Honoring the Bribery Agreement

p = 0.649
d = 0.090

p = 0.669

d = 0.088

Fisher’s Exact

Cohen’s d

64.4% (29 out of 45)
60.0% (33 out of 55)

67.5% (27 out of 40)

63.3% (38 out of 60)

Thrower

High Trust (Trust ≥ 4)

Scorer

All participants
(n = 100 pairs)

Low Trust (Trust < 4)

% Endorse Bribery

Table 3. Trust and Bribery Endorsement

d = 0.220

p = 0.338

50.0% (13 out of 26)

61.1% (11 out of 18)

Thrower

d = 0.585

p = 0.319

78.6% (11 out of 14)

100% (6 out of 6)

Scorer

d = 0.406

p = 0.550

90.9% (10 out of 11)

100% (9 out of 9)

Thrower

Participants in the corrupt cluster
(n = 20 pairs)

d = - 0.201

p = 0.364

63.0% (17 out of 27)

52.9% (9 out of 17)

Scorer

Participants in the corrupt cluster
(n = 44 pairs)

d = - 0.049

p = 0.540

69.0% (20 out of 29)

66.7% (18 out of 27)

Thrower

d = 0.115

p = 0.574

89.5% (17 out of 19)

85.7% (12 out of 14)

Scorer

d = 0.857

p = 0.018**

68.8% (11 out of 16)

100% (17 out of 17)

Thrower

Participants in the clean cluster
(n = 33 pairs)

d = 0.317

p = 0.191

63.6% (21 out of 33)

78.3% (18 out of 23)

Scorer

Participants in the clean cluster
(n = 56 pairs)
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Table 5. Logistic Regressions with Discrete Measure of Trust
Bendorse(S)

Bendorse(T)

Honor(S)

(100 pairs)

Honor(T)
(53 pairs)

Trust

0.143 (0.15)

0.086 (0.83)

-0.027 (-0.20)

0.422** (2.57)

Constant

0.566 (1.38)

0.170 (0.41)

1.985*** (2.88)

0.678 (0.91)

-64.73

-65.939

-20.673

-17.355

Wald χ2 (1)

0.02

0.69

0.04

6.59

Prob > χ

0.882

0.408

0.844

0.010

Log-likelihood
2

Note. bootstrapped z-scores in parentheses (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1), with 500 bootstrapped replications.

Consistent with the results shown in Table 4, when we ran the regressions separately for the clean and the corrupt country clusters, the positive role that trust
plays in Throwers’ likelihood of honoring the bribe payment only holds in the
clean country cluster.

Additional Results: Cheating Propensity and
the Justifiability of Corruption
Trust and Cheating Propensity. Although we found some evidence that trust supports antisocial cooperation, we have not shown whether in our sample there is
some supporting evidence that trust is also involved in honest behavior, that is,
whether high levels of trust (the belief that most people are trustworthy) have
a negative correlation with cheating for oneself. For that, we ran an additional
analysis correlating trust and cheating propensity (for private benefit) in the noninteractive cheating game.
Based on simple logistic regressions, we found that the correlation between trust
and the cheating propensity dummy is negligibly negative (r = -0.075, p = 0.218, LR
χ2 = 1.52, n = 200). There is a miniscule tendency among more trusting participants
to cheat less for themselves. When we ran the regressions in the high-corruption
or low-corruption country cluster separately, however, we found a marginally
significant and negative correlation in the low-corruption cluster (r = -0.158, p =
0.055, LR χ2 = 3.82, n = 112), but barely any correlation, and if any, a positive one,
in the high-corruption cluster (r = 0.057, p = 0.594, LR χ2 = 0.29, n = 88). At least
in the low-corruption cluster, trust seems to have a bright side, as more trusting
participants tend to cheat less. It could be argued that those who trust people to
be trustworthy are themselves trustworthy and honest, so they are less inclined to
cheat for themselves (Krueger, Massey, & DiDonato, 2008).
Robustness Controlling for Cheating Propensity. Since the propensity to cheat for
oneself has an effect on endorsing bribery as shown by Jiang (2015b), cheating
propensity can be a potential confound for trust, although the correlation between
trust and cheating propensity is weak. Hence we also checked the robustness of
our main result controlling for cheating propensity. As shown in Table 6 the result
is robust controlling for cheating propensity.
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Table 6. Logistic Regressions with Discrete Measure of Trust
Bendorse(S)

Bendorse(T)

Honor(S)

(100 pairs)

Honor(T)
(53 pairs)

Trust

0.028 (0.25)

0.086 (0.81)

0.155 (0.61)

0.408** (2.48)

Cheating

2.69** (2.15)

-0.041 (-0.03)

6.455 (1.20)

-1.274 (-0.37)

Constant

-1.557 (-1.38)

0.204 (0.16)

-3.410 (-0.84)

1.765 (0.59)

-61.855

-65.939

-17.740

-17.245

Wald χ (1)

4.73

0.67

1.47

6.29

Prob > χ

0.094

0.714

0.142

0.043

Log-likelihood
2

2

Note. Bootstrapped z-scores in parentheses (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1), with 500 bootstrapped replications.

Trust, Justifiability of Corruption in WVS, and CPI. It can be argued that more trusting participants in the low-corruption cluster but not in the high-corruption cluster might find corruption less justifiable. To test on this possibility, we ran further
regressions using the World Value Survey data (2010–2014) on trust and how justifiable cheating and bribe taking are seen at the individual level in countries with
varying perceived corruption levels. Respondents were asked to rate the justifiability of the following five behaviors related to cheating and bribery (10: always
justifiable; 1: never justifiable):
• Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled
• Avoiding a fare on public transportation
• Stealing property
• Cheating on taxes if you have the chance
• Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
The overall reliability score of the five items was reasonably high (Cronbach’s α =
0.845) and hence we constructed an overall index of justifiability of cheating and
bribe taking by taking the mean of all five items. In our samples, the clean cluster
consists of Japan [the score of Corruption Perception Index (CPI): 8] and the Netherlands (CPI: 8.9), whereas the corrupt cluster consists of China (CPI: 3.6) and Italy
(CPI: 3.9). Here we first examined whether the correlation between trust and the
justifiability of corruption is different for countries perceived to be at least as clean
as Japan and for countries perceived to be at least as corrupt as Italy. It turns out
that for countries with CPI ≥ 8, the overall correlation was negative and significant,
though very small, F(1, 10232) = 8.28, r = -0.044, p = 0.004. More trusting participants found corruption less justifiable. For countries with CPI ≤ 3.9, the correlation
was also significant, but positive, F(1, 41609) = 97.87, r = 0.081, p < 0.001, that is,
more trusting participants found corruption more justifiable.
In light of this additional piece of evidence, we further examined if the correlation between trust and justifiability of corruption was overall more negative for
the clean countries. We took the significance of the regression coefficient of “Trust”
and “Overall justifiability” in each country as the dependent variable and the CPI
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score of a country as the independent variable. We found that the t-value of the
coefficient (Mean = 0.553, Standard Deviation = 3.475) was negatively correlated
with the CPI score, F(1, 52) = 4.70, r = -0.462, p = 0.035. This finding highlights the
complexity of the relationship between trust and corruption.

Discussion
The results indicate that the relationship between trust and corruption is more
complex than the traditional view that high-trust countries are less corrupt (e.g.,
Rothstein, 2000). First, there are different kinds of corruption. For instance, bribery
is very different from embezzlement. Bribery requires trust, because bribery agreements cannot be legally enforced. In the case of bribery, our experiment shows
that trust enables corruption since more trusting bribers are more likely to honor
the bribe payment in the two low-corruption countries. This is the dark side of trust
(Tonoyan, 2005). In contrast, embezzlement does not require trust, since it involves
only the embezzler. As a result, trust might play a deterring role in embezzlement
as more trusting participants tend to cheat less in the two low-corruption countries, which is the bright side of trust.
Second, trust plays a role only at a specific stage in the bribery transaction. Our
results show that trust is important when executing the bribery agreement, but
not when negotiating a potential bribery agreement. In other words, trust matters
for bribery enforcement, but not for bribery endorsement in situations in which
endorsement is not costly. Only when executing the agreement, that is, when costs
are incurred, does the need to trust the other party arise. One will only honor the
agreement when one trusts that the other will honor the agreement as well and
will not take advantage of one’s vulnerable position in the shady context of bribery.
A third complication arises when thinking of the different roles in a bribery transaction. We have shown that trust only influences whether the briber (the Thrower,
in our game) honors the agreement: it does not influence the extent to which the
bribee (the Scorer, in our game) honors the agreement.
To understand the reasons for the asymmetric effect of trust on the different
players’ roles, let us consider the different tasks entailed by the two roles: while
Thrower’s agreed-upon action is to pay Scorer a side payment in return for a cheating service, Scorer’s agreed-upon action is to cheat for Thrower. In other words,
Thrower’s action has a monetary cost, since Thrower has to transfer earning points,
while Scorer’s part of the agreement—cheating in favor of Thrower—does not cost
Scorer any earning points. Trust might play a much less important role for Scorers, because honoring the agreement has no monetary cost, whereas for Throwers
trusting that the other will honor the agreement is an important consideration that
motivates keeping a promise, even at a personal cost. This result is consistent with
findings in Jiang (2015b) where the effect of pro-sociality on honoring a bribe also
interacts with the role of the player: while more pro-social Throwers tend to honor
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the bribe payment, more pro-social Scorers are not more or less likely to honor the
cheating service.
Finally, our experiment suggests something surprising, namely, that trust matters in clean countries but we do not find evidence that supports its role in corrupt
countries. We speculate that in corrupt countries corruption is a descriptive, and
possibly a social, norm: in such countries most people are corrupt and expect that
most others are corrupt, too. Hence, trust is much less important in countries with
widespread corruption than in clean countries, in which it is not obvious that one
will find a trustworthy partner in crime.
Here, we offer some speculations on why the effect of trust only plays a role in
clean countries. In a clean country, corruption is uncommon. Therefore, the expectation is that people will not cheat easily. A low-trust Thrower may have little
faith that the Scorer will fulfill the agreement. The low-trust Thrower may think
that even a Scorer who agreed to be bribed may have second thoughts, or just be
the type of person who reneges on promises if there is something to be gained. A
high-trust person, however, might still keep his promises as the psychological cost
of promise breaking is too high. If, however, corruption is the descriptive norm in
a country or society, it is common to enter and honor bribery agreements, and trust
may play a much lesser role.
The low correlation at the individual level between trust and personal cheating
in the two more corrupt countries is consistent with the result that there is little
correlation between trust and bribery in the high-corruption cluster. One potential
explanation for this finding is that when corruption is socially accepted or even
expected (Bicchieri, 2006, 2015), individuals may engage in it without feeling that
their behavior is socially detrimental. In such a context, even high-trust people
may be likely to engage in corruption. In a clean society, however, corruption is
infrequent and socially condemned. In such a society, engaging in corruption is
more likely to be a personal, somewhat deviant choice, as it is not a socially expected or condoned behavior.
There are several caveats we need note. First, we investigated the specific case, in
which the benefit to the briber is at least as large as the cost to experimenter: bribing therefore is not inefficient, though the psychological cost of the abuse of power
may still remain. Thus, our result might not generalize to situations in which the
social harm produced by cheating is more salient. For future research, one might
consider making the social harm significant instead of merely hurting the experimenter, so that the bribery deal is socially inefficient in a salient and costly way.
Second, Scorer’s honoring of the cheating service is only psychologically costly, if any, but not monetarily. Future research could examine whether the results
would hold if honoring cheating becomes payoff-wise costly, by incorporating the
risk of being punished when cheating is discovered.
Third, in the bribery game, trusting and trustworthiness are not clearly separated. Thrower’s untrustworthy defection on Scorer, or the other way around,
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could result from lack of trust on the other’s trustworthiness. Thus, the success of
a bribery deal—the pair reaching a bribery agreement that is honored by both parties—crucially depends on the mutual trust. Depending on the research questions,
future research can also utilize a sequential variant of the game with symmetric
information so that the bribee is informed about the bribe amount paid before he
plays the cheating game, to resemble more a real life bribery situation.
Finally, although attitudinal trust has been found to predict behavioral trustworthiness in a trust game (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000), one promising direction
would be to correlate behavioral trustworthiness and the propensity to honor a
bribery agreement. Moreover, multi-item trust measures (e.g., Couch, Adams, &
Jones, 1996; Couch & Jones, 1997; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) might give more
robust results than the single-item measure we used.

Conclusion
This study sheds some light on the complex relationship between trust and corruption. The role trust plays in corruption can potentially have both a bright and
a dark side. Our results shed light on the negative role trust plays in facilitating
bribery agreements that are difficult to enforce. Moreover, the bribery game we
used (see Jiang, 2015b) provides a tool to study this complex relationship. Our
study cannot offer final answers to the puzzle of trust and corruption: it can only
indicate in which directions we should go.
Here are some questions that merit an answer: What is the impact of particularized trust versus generalized trust on bribery behavior? How do expectations
about the other party honoring his or her part of the agreement matter? What is
the relationship between trust and expectations, and how do they interact and
drive the dynamics of bribery over time? These are important questions that involve large-scale sociopolitical phenomena that affect the welfare of many people.
We believe future experiments can take further steps to answer some of these crucial questions.
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Appendix
To shed light on the dynamics of bribery negotiation and illustrate some of the thinking of
corrupt participants in the lab setting, we cite some excerpts from the chats in the bribing
stage. The content of these chats shows that many participants were well aware of the possibility of bribing, and provides some evidence about the role of trust in the bribery game.
First, there is evidence from the chat data that participants perceive the bribery game as a
bribery situation. Here is an example from Jiang (2015b) that shows that some participants
explicitly express their aversion to bribery while others claim that it is just “a virtual game.”
The conversation between the Chinese pair goes as follows:
Scorer: “Hi. = = Is this [huilu](translation: bribery in Chinese)? Sigh. My heart is
so very tangled up. Ha, no need to give anything.”
Thrower: “Yes, you choose the biggest every time and I will give you 13, what
do you think? Because if you choose the biggest one every time, I can earn 15*3
= 75. But you can only earn 50. So if I give you 13, then we are even?”
Scorer: “Are you male?”
Thrower: “Sorry, it should be 15*5 = 75. Yes, I am male. Then we both do 13.”
Scorer: “Hey, I don’t like bribe.”
Thrower: “It is almost time. What can we do then. This is just a virtual game. It
is an economic decision, not political bribery.”
Now let us look at a Japanese conversation. Although Japanese conversations tend to be
very short, the dynamics of the bribery negotiation is clearly exposed, even within a few
sentences. For instance, a Japanese Scorer says that the expected payoff of Thrower would
be 75 (without explicitly saying if he would cheat) and asks about the transfer. Thrower
says: “Personally, zero is good.” Scorer agrees in a very nice way. The Thrower then reveals
his preference for honesty in an implicit way: “Could I ask for a total number about 50?”
These examples show that some participants do take the game seriously: cheating is not
good. But a substantial proportion of participants in our experiment did mention cheating explicitly or implicitly. While in the bribing stage the participants could decide on a
“transfer,” it was clear that many saw it as an opportunity to offer or solicit bribes in return
for cheating in the next stage. In the Netherlands, participants even cover up their cheating
with humor. When a Dutch Thrower, not convinced that his expected payoff would be 75,
said: “But I don’t always throw that high,” the Scorer answered: “But I always think high.”
Here is how a Japanese Thrower requests the favor after offering a bribe: “We will need the
Scorer to have a very keen guess.”
Another observation from the chat data is that participants were also aware that the transfer relies on trust. In particular, Scorer needs to trust that Thrower does input X as promised.
A Dutch Scorer said: “I can’t be sure about what you put as X, so I will just have to trust
you as well…Filling it in now. Filled it in?” Here is another Dutch pair who just agreed to
input 12.5. Scorer: “Is it working over there?” Thrower: “No. I think you have to fill in whole
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numbers. So 12 then?” Scorer: “Ha-ha, just checking whether you really filled in 12.5. Smiley.
Well, because it’s you: 12.”
Some enforcement mechanism like oral blackmailing also emerged as a result of the challenge on trust. For instance, an Italian Thrower proposes a transfer of zero. Scorer: “Well,
but then I will punish you, and I write that I had always chosen in mind the side unfavorable for you…If we agree something like 20, I will always mark the favorable side for you
and you will be fine.” Thrower says that a negative transfer is better for him/her but cannot
convince Scorer. Thrower: “Let’s do 5. 20 is too much.” Scorer: “Let’s do 17: It brings good
luck. If we get a lot of 1s, I mark the down side and you earn 6.” Thrower: “I don’t believe
it. I don’t trust it. 10 and we don’t talk more.” Scorer: “15 last offer.” Thrower: “Mmm…
OK.” Result: Thrower indeed transfers 15 and Scorer indeed always picks the good sides.
It is also interesting to see that Italians negotiate a lot but do not revolt against being blackmailed and do not punish blackmailers—suggesting that they might see it as a legitimate
bargaining strategy.
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